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ABSTRACT The paper contrasts two domains of school education, natural science
and citizenship education (as a paradigm of “hard” and “soft” subjects), with re-
spect to their epistemological and ethical foundations. A sharp contrast between
their associated world-views within the school community is accentuated at the
outset. The epistemological shortcomings inherent in both are subsequently ex-
plored, and the debate between epistemological relativism and “naturalism” (a form
of foundationalism) relating to scientific knowledge is briefly reviewed. Through
review of organizational principles behind selection of knowledge for presentation
in schools, values are introduced as an epistemically, as well as ethically, important
component of school education. Subsequent analysis aims to show that even in
this respect there are more similarities between the “soft” and “hard” subjects than
is standardly assumed.
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1. “Hard” and “soft” in education
“[...] in its broadest sense, education is simply one aspect of socialization: it
involves the acquisition of knowledge and the learning of skills. Whether
intentionally or unintentionally, education often also helps to shape beliefs
and moral values.” (Haralambos and Holborn, 2000: 774)
In 1993, Hirst charted the transition in his educational philosophy from the domi-
nance of analytical philosophy and rationalism of the 1960s and 1970s towards
the 1990s primary concern with social practices. This was partly due to realiza-
tion that the former development of uniform rational individuals was detached
from the real biological and psychological demands of human nature, as well as
neglectful of the individuality of every student. The latter utilitarian ideal of maxi-
mising the overall personal satisfaction in the society sees rationality as a mere
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guide and not as a means in itself. Education, then, is more than an acquisition of
knowledge; it is an initiation into rationally enhanced social practices to secure
the most efficient satisfaction of wants. Propositional knowledge here is of great
importance in securing the wide-reach and efficacy of beneficial practices, but is
only a second order category built out of critical reflection on first order satisfac-
tion of practical wants (Hirst, 1993).
In some areas of education (e.g. “soft” subjects such as citizenship education1)
explicit transmission of values may be of primary importance, and it is on them
that the knowledge of each individual, marred by the lack of certainty, can rest
and be evaluated. Whether or not this programme can indeed be successful in
such subjects does not seem at first glance to be a route open for natural sci-
ences education, as it should follow the aims of its practised discipline in being
value-free.
According to the 20th century “standard” view, educational transmission of sci-
entific knowledge is compelled to follow the canon of general scientific culture
(Cooper calls this “naturalism”, and, though a rough sketch, it will serve for il-
lustration here) that states that there is no more to the world than is depictable,
in principle, by the natural sciences; that human beings are entirely natural ele-
ments within that world; that value and meaning are not entertained by natural
scientific enquiry, they constitute no part of the world, but are “projected” onto
it by us. Thus, an important ideal in education is that of the rational autonomy
of mind, achievable (unparadoxically) through participation in public, crite-
ria-governed modes of enquiry. The theoretical task in education, most notably
natural sciences education, was to train the uninitiated mind in developing its
rational autonomy to be applied to certain spheres of experience. (Cooper,
1998: 31–32)
Other than the obvious difference from the global universality of science and
mathematics (though, there are arguments against this claim as well; cf. Lévy-
Leblond, 2006), political knowledge (over and above some minimal propositional
political theory) is much more malleable and dependent on the context of space
and time.2 It is also much more explicitly suffused with explicit value judge-
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science) are not absolutely given, and much of what is said about either or both is appli-
cable to other school subjects as well. Perhaps what is characteristic about the chosen
ones is that neither is seen as requiring any special talent, such as arts and literature or
mathematics might be.
2 For example, political knowledge transformation in education in England over the past
decade or so has meant a shift from the subject “Civics” to “Citizenship”, introduced as a
compulsory school subject at Key Stages 3 and 4 in 2002 (arguably altering the teaching
and learning methodology as well, Doolan, 2003), whereas in Croatia this knowledge tran-
sformation has included a shift from the subject “Self management and the fundamentals
ments. Furthermore, public education (most directly subjects dealing with politi-
cal education) impacts what is considered valid and relevant political knowledge
in any given community.
2. “Hard” knowledge
A simple, but widely popular educational model (Bruner, 1996; Hirst, 1975;
Winch, 1999) sees education as persistent gathering of propositional knowledge.
Propositional is the “knowledge that”, also known as theoretical or factual knowl-
edge, “knowledge that p”, where p is a proposition expressing some fact or
other. We are, therefore, expected to make sense of all experiences by subsum-
ing them under knowledge that is in correspondence with reality, knowledge that
consists of a canon of unshakeable propositions concerning that reality. By using
the (alleged) “organ of reason”, we arrange the said knowledge into a hierarchi-
cal structure that corresponds to the hierarchical structure of reality (both natural
and social). This structure is directly reflected in education as well.
However, it takes a minor tremor underneath this elaborate network of direct
connections between knowledge, reality and mind to cast doubts on the validity
of an educational model focused solely on the gathering of propositional knowl-
edge. Philosophically, we are not only in dire straits to provide a satisfactory
model of truth that allows us to pick the appropriate factual propositions from a
wealth of meaningful but untrue ones, but we also lack a satisfactory account of
which instances of belief (something in the mind) are knowledge (and thus factu-
ally connected to the world) and which are not (while we can also ask whether
knowledge contains belief at all). Furthermore, even if a canon of true proposi-
tions is constructed, not all are equally worth knowing and learning, so a selec-
tion must be made regarding their presentation and curricular organisation. Un-
der a further assumption that the supposed body of knowledge is directly influ-
enced by what is taught at schools, such as is placed before the model of politi-
cal knowledge above, these issues gain additional importance.
Moreover, we have to be able to differentiate the utterance “Paris is now the cap-
ital of France” by a geography teacher conducting a lesson about France, from
the same utterance by an actor who has never heard of France whilst performing
a play containing the said line. We expect that a person knows that p only if he
or she can differentiate the truth of that p from its relevant alternatives (Goldman,
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of Marxism” to “Politics and Economics” (arguably changing the content of propositional
knowledge transmitted, though not the teaching methodology) that took place in 1992. .
Interestingly, in both cases, one could argue that the transformations to the subject were
wrought by political changes. Namely, in England, the Labour Party won the elections in
1997, whilst Croatia’s independence in 1991 meant a shift from a socialist to a democratic
system of governance.
1976),3 i.e. appropriation of knowledge is not demonstrated (e.g. in school as-
sessment) through mere imitation (this point will be raised again in the case of
procedural knowledge).
Traditional conceptual analysis of propositional knowledge, from Plato on-
wards, has mostly demanded that knowledge should entail truth and that it
should not be accidentally acquired, i.e. that it should be reduced to a justified
true belief (the so-called tripartite analysis: knowledge = truth+belief+justifica-
tion). What can and how it can be admitted as appropriate justification in the
said analyses is the crux of a longstanding debate. It can be said that 20th cen-
tury epistemology has been dedicated, but without success in the form of a
consensus, to refinement and extension of the tripartite analysis. Still, for every
analysis there seemed to be an intuitively appealing4 counter-example showing
it to be inadequate to differentiate all knowledge from non-knowledge. In the
end, the very justifiability of analysis is brought into question by proposing that
knowledge is a primary state that cannot be reduced to more basic constituents
(Williamson, 2000: I).
But a (loosely called) postmodern critique aims to move away from the attempts
to find normative proscriptions about the possibility of knowledge towards denial
of status to what we would normally like to consider knowledge. The post-
modernists wish to warn all those that “produce” knowledge that all that is said
and written is forever susceptible to denial, alternation and the politics of the
community in which it exists (Ward, 1996: 33). This is especially geared towards
the crumbling of the academic hegemony of science, towards perpetual warning
of epistemic relativism and problems of representation of experience, in order to
weaken the monopoly of one discipline over access to truth. Thus, in our search
for the bare minimum of knowledge that satisfies the conditions set by different
analyses, we have come increasingly close to attributing the status of knowledge
to individual beliefs dependent on the contexts in which they arise and in which
they are assessed for validity. Whereas such a conclusion is almost readily ac-
cepted for a large part of political knowledge, the accompanying debate in the
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3 Of course, the issue of determination of relevant alternatives remains, and cannot be ad-
dressed here. Briefly, such an alternative is where the cause of belief that p is partially al-
tered whilst the surrounding physical context remains the same. But, in education, stu-
dents often approach given situations with a ready-made view of the context, and in many
cases the task of education is not only to convince the students that p is true, but also to
place p in a new context. For example, the Earth’s rotation around the Sun is perceptually
identical to the Sun’s rotation around the Earth (as viewed from an everyday Earth-bound
perspective). The causes of both beliefs are perceptually indistinguishable. What differen-
tiates them is the remaining physical context that the students are to be introduced to, i.e.
the planets of the Solar system, planetary mechanics etc.
4 A striking feature of propositional knowledge seems to be that, despite having been
unable to formulate a satisfactory analysis for centuries, we can intuitively tell whether
proposed counter-examples are or are not instances of knowledge.
sciences will illustrate the nuances of searching for a solid (even if narrow) foun-
dation of knowledge, and its connection to understanding of value.
Ryle’s development of the analysis of procedural knowledge, and general raising
of awareness about its significance within analytical epistemology, is based on
the drive to defeat the Cartesian illusion that our mental life consists solely of the
search for answers to theoretical questions, conducted internally/silently (Ryle,
1949:I). Ryle says that in education, as well as in everyday life, skills (both practi-
cal and intellectual) are much more important than individual cognitive reper-
toires. In life, activities that people perform are much more important than the
truths they learn. Indeed, Ryle says, learned action is not the side effect of theo-
rising, but theorising is an activity that can be performed in a learned or ignorant
manner (Ryle, 1949: II). In fact, in education, we often protest someone’s igno-
rance of the fact merely for the foolishness of which such ignorance is a conse-
quence.
But what is the essence of the knowledge of how to do something, such as using
grammatical speech, chess playing, fishing or debating? Part of it is the successful
performance of these actions. However, this is an insufficient part for the whole
know-how. A well-adjusted clock and the well-trained circus seal can effortlessly
perform certain operations, but we would not say that they know how to show
time and balance a ball on their nose, respectively. Knowing how to do some-
thing does not consist solely of the satisfactory execution of an action, according
to some set of criteria, but also in voluntary application of those criteria.
An action is considered carefully executed, crafty or successful if the performer is
capable of detection and correction of mistakes, repetition and improvement of
the successful performance, learning from the example of others etc. Such a per-
son applies criteria in a critical performance, i.e. in a voluntary attempt to exe-
cute a good performance. We are prone to pronounce that such a person thinks
what he/she is doing. However, Ryle warns that this should not be used as an
excuse to try to reduce the procedural to propositional knowledge (by claiming
that a successful performance must be founded on the cognitive articulation of
the propositions that guide/describe the action).
Such a reduction would make procedural knowledge an extension of proposi-
tional knowledge. A reductio ad absurdum of description of cases of successful
procedural knowledge instantiation can be used to show this is not the case:
master chefs do not recite the lines of recipes in their head whilst cooking, the
lifeguards do not restate the moral imperative or the terms of contract of employ-
ment before swimming out to save the drowning individual etc. There are also
numerous instances of successful know-how performances for which it is not
easy, if it is at all possible, to formulate the propositional rules and criteria. A
good comedian would be at loss to explicate the exact rules that guide him
through the writing and telling of good jokes, even though he can demonstrate
that he knows how to tell a good joke and knows how to recognise a bad one.
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Ryle’s analysis, therefore, runs into trouble in setting the explicit (propositional)
criteria that differentiate procedural knowledge from successful imitation/theatri-
cal performance. After abandoning the ‘internally’ elaborated theoretical founda-
tion of successful performance as a guarantee of procedural knowledge posses-
sion, Ryle fails to say what it is within/about the performance or the performer
that makes the successful performance of an action different from crafty imitation
of a successful performance of a given process (except for the still ambiguous
dictum that a performer ought to be ‘thinking what he/she is doing’). We are left
with a Wittgensteinian solution (Wittgenstein, 1967) of relying on the context:
standards set by the community or culture of the performer; but do not get much
clearer about selection of suitable procedural knowledge to be transmitted
through education, nor the methodology of transmission that would ensure ap-
propriation of procedural knowledge and not mere successful displays of its imi-
tation. Both types of knowledge are cornered by analytical demands for decons-
truction of absolutist pictures often presented in schools, and appreciation of
epistemological relativism (the role of community and social practice in concep-
tions of knowledge).
3. How “hard” is science?
Proponents of “naturalism” could still claim that the knowledge associated with
their world-view is capable to transcend its community-based origins in the
ways that political knowledge cannot. This is in line with Carnap’s (1967)
positivistic programme of unification of language and laws of all sciences and
their foundation in the simplest (a.k.a. unshakable) observation-statements of
our language (corresponding to some of our foundational experiences). Though
such positivist aspirations have subsequently been abandoned, their applicabil-
ity in education is not to be neglected. After all, students can see that steam
rises from boiling water or that balls accelerate when rolling downhill. In the
light of Hirst’s “social practices initiation” (Hirst, 1993) we might want to argue
that the “naturalist” world-view (though, of its own admission, aiming to be
value-free) incorporates the most universal and, in at least some domains of ex-
perience, beneficial social practice available today. Though initiation into social
practices focused on the development of individuals is not founded solely upon
transmission of theoretical scientific knowledge, such knowledge, as enshrined
in the Western scientific practice, will prove to be of the most universal benefit.
Jean-Marc Lévy-Leblond (2006) argues that even if that may be so it is not be-
cause of some necessarily universal validity of Western science, but solely due
to the contingent fact of its contemporary dominance in global social practices.
He bases such claim both on the overview of alternative, and in their own con-
text, successful scientific practices through history, as well as the claim that
some cultures have achieved dominance despite turning their back on scientific
development (most notably Ancient Rome) (Lévy-Leblond, 2006:28; also Hodson,
1998:204). Accepting some such argument, we may still legitimise initiation into
scientific social practice (sadly leaving that term in itself insufficiently explored,
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save for Cooper’s summary above), but not for the reasons such practice as-
cribes to itself.
Such criticism can be further used to legitimise the abandonment of the “natural-
ist” methodology in education as a whole as it cannot guarantee the provision of
sufficiently broad understanding of experience, for it deliberately leaves out an
important segment of it (the value-based aspect). This acknowledges the failure
of scientific attempts to strip the knowledge-gathering of all inessential distur-
bances and thus “speak the language of the world”. “Relativist”5 critique demands
that such thoroughgoing aim be abandoned (to a varying degree depending on
how radical the authors are) based on two “philosophical” theses: (1) that there
is no mechanical recipe for obtaining knowledge (based on the problem of satis-
factory analysis of knowledge in epistemology and philosophy of science), and
(2) that no decision can be made between competing explanatory conceptual
schemes (leading to a form of epistemological and ontological relativism)
(Luntley, 1995). As humans we do not seem to have universal access to truth
over and above the reasons, proofs and justifications to which we explicitly as-
sent.
“Naturalism” can, on the other hand, accept that all processes of knowledge pro-
duction and codification are social (“cultural”) and as such bear the marks of
their context of production. Once we accept that all knowledge is social in char-
acter, then this very fact stops being the demarcation criterion used in evaluation
of knowledge. But the fact that all knowledge is socially produced does not
mean that all knowledge is epistemologically (philosophically, theoretically) the
same. For there is a crucial difference between production of knowledge and its
emergent properties, we must see that even though socially produced, knowledge
has the power to transcend the conditions under which it has been created
(Moore, 2000). Thus different knowledge can have different not-socially-con-
structed value (along some widely-applicable scale) associated with it. Such legit-
imation of scientific knowledge can be used to bear on the questions of the role
of the associated world-view in educational practice. If such universal applicabil-
ity of values can be achieved, then scientific world-view may as yet rule the
roost.
Bear in mind, though, that the “relativists” have not proven (according to the
above sketch, they have not even tried as much) that the true states of affairs do
not exist. Their criticism of knowledge rests on a claim that such states of affairs
are not directly and inherently accessible to human enquiry. Though history of
philosophy and science warn us that the ways in which we conceptualise the
world, what we ground our experiences in, can be susceptible to human fleeting
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5 This is just a sketch-name for purposes of illustration. It is hard to group so many diffe-
rent positions under one umbrella, and throughout this text the term is used to cover such
schools/positions as of postmodernists, hermeneutics, constructivists and the like.
interests, it is still reasonable6 to assume that whether these conceptualisations
are correct or not, whether they are true or false, depends primarily not on how
we are inclined to construct them but on the state of affairs in the real world (cf.
Carr, 2003: 130).7 This is an unavoidable constriction in every construction of
knowledge, and a concept of “value” that respects what could provide the
grounding for cross-cultural applicability of the “naturalist” world-view in at least
some domains of experience. Alternatively, perhaps the said constriction can pro-
vide the criteria of evaluation to adjudicate the worth of different segments of
knowledge or pretenders to the title.
A more detailed examination of the “naturalist” canon above may allow for its
modification that combines the epistemological “fallibilism” with ontological real-
ism, and gives some idea of the specific concept of value that is rooted in ‘natu-
ralist culture’. There are limitations placed on knowledge by the independently
existing reality though that knowledge itself is, at least in part, socially con-
structed (Smith and Hodkinson, 2002).8 Just as we are not in everyday life the
fully rational creatures idealised by the “naturalist” picture, so the great techno-
logical advances based on contemporary science and used in the everyday life of
most cultures today cannot be attributed solely to chance or radical social
constructivism, and the novel predictions of phenomena arising from contempo-
rary science are unparalleled in their reliability by other cultural practices operat-
ing in the same domain of experience. Paraphrasing Goldman’s more technical
account, scientific practices are more reliable predictors of interaction with the
external world than any set of non-scientific practices available to human beings
in answering the sorts of questions that science seeks to answer (Goldman,
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6 Of course, relativists may cry foul here, and claim that what we may find reasonable or
unreasonable is not universal but a product of our social and historical context. In a possi-
ble parallel context then it may not be at all reasonable to assume that the correctness of
our conceptualisations of the world depends on some ideally objective and real state of af-
fairs, but on the whim of some omnipotent being, the workings of the reality- generating
deception machine or some such factor. Even this much may be conceded here, providing
we keep in mind that none of our friends or foes, no member of our, or any other com-
munity we may come to interact with, is or can be such an omnipotent being or machine.
The issue is not whether we are mistaken, or even deliberately deceived, about the detai-
led structure of some independent reality, but whether such a reality, as independent of
our actions and will, does or does not exist.
7 According to Carr the fallacious blurring of the distinction between truth and judgement
is to blame for consequential epistemic relativism (ibid.).
8 Furthermore, and this is especially important for science education, we have to be aware
of a difference between knowledge as fact and knowledge as explanation of the given fact
(Carr, 2003:129). The two are seldom interchangeable for they may carry a vastly different
deal of conviction (a fact may be objectively accepted and verified, though its explanation
may not be). Within scientific world-view there is currently a varying degree of success in
provision of explanation. Thus, the hard-to-defend examples need not carry conviction
against the whole enterprise.
1999:247). But in the educational context, a sociologically motivated fact that sci-
entific research and utilization of its products are not value-free cannot be ig-
nored (Hodson, 1998:203).
On the other hand, it is frivolous to lump all relativist critique in the band of vul-
gar relativism ascribing all interpretations of sensory experience to a contingent
set of social conventions. Serious relativist critique does not advocate an “any-
thing goes” scenario, but merely demands that we abandon the false hope of
reading the cosmic register of truths (now and for ever in the future). We are still
free to make judgements and prefer some things to other, and will continue to
do so. But they warn of a circle in naturalist reasoning (a circle that may or may
not be vicious): to know the true state of affairs we must have a procedure dis-
tinguishing true from false appearances, to know that the said procedure is reli-
able we must know that it is successful in distinguishing the true from false ap-
pearances, but to know the latter we must already know (via some other
method) which appearances are true and which are false (i.e. know what the
true state of affairs is) (Smith and Hodkinson, 2002: 293, attributing the precise
formulation to Chisholm, 1973). Similarly, Kukla and Walmsley, 2004, argue that
the “explanatoriness” provided by science cannot be used as value in any argu-
ment that seeks to establish the values behind belief in scientific claims. Thus, we
cannot too easily smuggle in some sort of value foundationalism to replace the
epistemic one, but could perhaps offer different evaluative criteria for different
stages of the supposed circle.
4. Organization of knowledge in education
“[...] from the vast universe of possible knowledge, only some knowledge
gets to be official knowledge, gets to be declared as legitimate!” (Apple,
1999)
Having identified some of the issues that plague knowledge and skills in general
(and thus affect their subsequent transformations), how do we represent each in
educational transmission? According to what “value” (intrinsic, instrumental, and
culturally conventional) should the selection be performed? Furthermore, how
and who combines them into a unified whole, a curricular body of knowledge?
Given the doubts about its certainty, is it the “hard” or the “soft” subjects that
should provide paradigms in educational transmission?
On one side there are those who claim that, at least in some fields of experience,
there are directly accessible facts, for which it is possible to prove as much. So it
is claimed that at least in those fields we have come across the unshakeable body
of propositional knowledge, on which to hinge our more tentative beliefs. Thus,
the “rationalists” claim that even though our senses are deceptive, by relying on
rational thinking (which is akin to use of the “organ of reason”) we can come to
know the unchangeable truth. In this way, a group of allegedly intellectually su-
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perior subjects (e.g. logic and mathematics) becomes the educational paradigm
guiding all other knowledge acquisition. Thus, it was taken that the study of for-
mal logic can aid the development of the rational mind and thus positively influ-
ence social and political life.9 This, however, turned out to be an empirically un-
supported assumption, as George and Gandhi (2005) show through a series of
examples of fine logicians and evil men. Moreover, since the 19th century and the
development of alternative geometries, the certainty in logical and mathematical
systems has been shaken through the introduction of the alternative systems to
those that the rationalists praised as the paradigm of absolutely certain knowl-
edge.
With regards to the issue of primacy of scientific education, Cooper maintains
that the opinions of US Pragmatists (James, Dewey, Putnam) ought to be instruc-
tive: when deciding between whole philosophical standpoints, questions of value
legitimately intervene. Thus, all such standpoints that can be shown to reinforce
“a bad culture” should be abandoned “and only an artificial dichotomy between
ethics and epistemology prevents people from recognizing this” (Cooper, 1998:
36). Cooper uses this to conclude that since the ‘naturalist’ world-view offers no
guide through “the experience of rightness and wrongness, [...], the significance
or insignificance of what there is in the world”, and yet those are some of the es-
sential components of our culture, of our everyday lives even, it deserves to be
abandoned in the wake of a “reflection on a pre-theoretical experience of the
‘lived world’” (Cooper, 1998:38).10
The primary role in education is then taken by the subjects based on phenome-
nal and experiential approach to the world (including the empirical dimension in
sciences). However, even in philosophy of science such hard-boiled empiricism
had to be abandoned under Popper’s criticism that the ideal empirical proof is
unattainable, the best that we can in any case hope for being the temporary cor-
roboration of a theory. Furthermore, to be able to bring the educational process
to some level of conclusion we need directly to transmit some of the ready-made
hypotheses about the world, as well as to direct any individual investigation in
search for the right clues. In that, we already heavily rely on language (as the
universal categorising code of the community), thus transmitting the non-empiri-
cal categorisation that a student is forced to accept tout court. Finally, just as was
the case with immutable rational systems, the history of empirical sciences has
shown them vulnerable to radical change of theoretical systems, thus completing
the circle of denying immutable certainty to knowledge gained through empirical
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9 Supposedly, Rudolf Carnap and Ernst Nagel supported Lillian Lieber’s intent to prevent
the occurrence of another world war through the study of formal logic (George and Gandhi,
2005: 32).
10 This is not to say that the legitimacy of scientific knowledge is denied altogether, it is
also not an argument against teaching science in schools. It merely advocates that such
education be confined to an enclosed niche within the educational system.
observation (cf. general criticism by Popper, 1963; reconstructed in the educa-
tional context in Moore, 2000).
More recent, “postmodernist” educational philosophy denies that it has ever been
possible to either ground knowledge in an absolutist or naturalist comprehension
of reality or to secure it by some immutable methodology. All knowledge is and
always has been, regardless of its ontological status or methodological source,
modified by language and interpretation. As such it is a product of a community,
and is imposed on the unsuspecting individual as “the truth” through curricular
selection. Admittedly, it is an achievement of (though not exclusively) the “new
sociology of education” to point out the importance of the social aspects of
knowledge production, some of which have an adverse influence, which can be
further complicated through the organisation of knowledge in the school curricu-
lum (Young, 1998).
5. How “soft” is political education?
“Assuming [...] that education should do something to afford a training [...],
the question arises whether education should train good individuals or go-
od citizens. [...] whatever view may be taken, it is difficult to deny that the
cultivation of the individual and the training of the citizen are different
things.” (Russell, 1932: I)
The position of political knowledge is especially acute here as, more than any
other aspect of the curriculum, education in politics and citizenship eventually af-
fects the political knowledge within a community.11 Recently, for example, it has
been explicitly stated that the school curricula are not pure theoretical constructs,
but have a social role to perform as well through the contribution to the develop-
mental needs of national economies (Standish, 2003; Flego et al., 2004: 21). An
alternative to such social conditioning would be to allow each individual to pick
and choose what they see fit from the collage of the “socially constructed body
of knowledge”. But pick and choose according to which criteria? Values that an
individual student adheres to (says White in 1995), if only those were to precede
theoretical (and expert practical) knowledge appropriation.
In the case of political knowledge, an important additional component is pro-
vided by values, either explicitly stated, or implicitly incorporated into the factual
structure. Thus, on one extreme view, all the relevant and universally applicable
values are included in the structure of the political system (this includes the con-
stitutional documents) and stand “behind” the knowledge of the theoretical oper-
ations of the political system (of the relevant community), so education merely
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11 There is no room here to get into discussions of educational outcomes of selected cur-
ricular context. For some general results not focused on political knowledge cf. Moore,
2000.
has to provide an introduction to the institutional practices of the State (including
the minimum procedural knowledge required). On the other extreme, children
(future citizens) should not be saddled with the communal practices in existence
now (as those are imperfect), but should be provided the full capacity of creating
their own means of public co-existence that must be constructed and practised
on the spot, under mere considerate guidance (but not instruction) from the
teachers (Giarelli, 1995).
Both extremes face problems. The former perpetuates the existing political sys-
tem, the existing arrangement of the community, with all its inadequacies, and
offers no scope to young citizens for autonomous individual development (which
should be a guaranteed freedom) in the political sphere. It is thus open to criti-
cism (again from standpoint theories) that it commits the state schooling system
to perpetuation and legitimation of the knowledge and values that serve to pre-
serve the interests of the ruling class (and to secure the reproduction of the dom-
inant means of production). This sort of criticism often puts forth the statement
that knowledge (especially when related to the political sphere) is never the-
ory-free and neutral (such as is the supposed ideal of scientific knowledge) and
that this is never elucidated in its curricular presentation (Harris, 1995). The latter,
on the other hand, is almost entirely open to repeating all the mistakes of the
past, thus allowing student communities to go through stages of fascism or slav-
ery-based society, before potentially settling (if ever, cf. Williams’ criticism of the
teleological assumption about social development, Williams: 2003) for a more lib-
eral and democratic structure. It is not clear how much considerate guidance
from the teachers is allowed here before the consequences become dire for at
least some groups of students.
The middle ground between the two extremes seems to lie in admitting the need
for as much ‘hands on’ experience as possible in the transmission of political
knowledge within the confines of the relevant society and culture as such, thus
encouraging active citizen participation over and above the often dry proposi-
tional knowledge about the theoretical operations of the political system. In this
way, Hirst’s call for social initiation through education is heeded in the obviously
acute case of political knowledge (Hirst, 1993). But in order to legitimise such
knowledge (both in transmission from teacher to student, and in the construct
the students end up with) there is a need for a set of values appropriated by
each student (this is a temporal as well as a conceptual precedent) upon which
the obviously uncertain and often impermanent knowledge may rest. This should
allow everyone to weed out some of the imperfections from such knowledge,
and thus provide individual control of knowledge through values (White, 1995).
But this middle ground rests on an assumption that there is a universally accept-
able distillate of values that are appropriate for all humans and whose appropria-
tion by students does not represent indoctrination of the style criticised above.
And this assumption is getting harder to justify in contemporary western societies
committed to value pluralism, as the condition they end up providing practically
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spells the end of political (and moral) education through extreme relativism that
is damaging to the individual, rather than liberating. On the other hand, the plu-
ralistic view is not a product of a political whim, but is a fact about contemporary
society, as well as a product of applying reason to the conduct of daily life.
Namely, it is desirable to instil in students (for, among others, reasons outlined
above) a set of values and show them that morality in general is more than an ar-
bitrary choice between conflicting alternatives. But reasonably it is hard, if at all
possible, to justify a choice of any given set over and above the said alternatives
(Mendus, 1998).
6. “Soft” values
Joseph Raz in (2003) proposes an explication of the concept of value that aims to
escape the thesis of social relativism whilst respecting the contemporary rational
call for value pluralism. He claims to have opened the route for reconciling the
objectivity (of existence) of values with their fluidity and sensitivity to social prac-
tices, to shared understanding and shared meanings. The objectivity (contrary to
the claims of Cooper’s naturalist) is reflected in the fixed and factual point of ref-
erence provided by the real-life social practices.
Raz argues that all values (some directly, and others indirectly) “exist only if there
are (or were) social practices sustaining them” (Raz, 2003: 19). Social practices
are necessary to bring values about, in the sense of providing a point of recogni-
tion of value that subsequently continues to exist without the associated social
practice, but also enables one to use it in evaluative judgements both retroac-
tively (thus to times before the “point of introduction”) and globally (to societies
that have not themselves instantiated the respective social practice). In this way,
his concept of value differs from relativism in allowing for a comparison of val-
ues beyond the social groups that instantiate the sustaining social practice (SSP),
and by making values metaphysically stronger than a convention.
He advocates the use of value judgements, or evaluations, with reference to
“genre” or perspective explicated by the context of the social practice engender-
ing a given value. He aims in this manner to allow for implementable value plu-
ralism that respects that there are many distinct values (that are not all manifesta-
tions of one and the same goodness) and that some of those values may be in-
compatible (i.e. that they cannot all be realised in the life of a single individual or
society). Of particular interest for education is that Raz is keen to reduce the ex-
tent of possible evaluative knowledge, whilst arguing for the very possibility of
some evaluative knowledge. In his words: “we can know something, but less
than is sometimes imagined” (Raz, 2003: 58). Needless to say this position has di-
rect parallels with the straightforwardly epistemological discussion above. Raz
claims that “since many value judgements are genre-based, they allow for knowl-
edge, based on the defining standards of the genre, and avoid contradiction [with
judgements from another genre], since different objects that belong to different
kinds can be judged by otherwise contradictory standards” (ibid.).
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But is Raz’s thesis (his explication of the concept of value) sufficient for the pro-
vision of selection of values, or even value-genres, for transmission through edu-
cation, given that education is part of a wider social practice? Again, in contem-
porary multicultural societies, which (at least) aim to replace many of their
founding myths with rational justification, what are the social practices to be se-
lected as engendering suitable values, whilst respecting the multicultural back-
grounds of their citizens and pupils? Even Raz seems defeatist on the first issue,
calling for a clarification of limitations on rational justification (Raz, 2003a). He is
inclined to agree with the point made by one of his critics “that reason is incapa-
ble of ever resolving the dispute in favour of one side or the other (that the mat-
ter is therefore essentially a political contestation, a struggle for power)” (Pippin,
2003: 101), whilst maintaining that the conceptual explication he provides helps
make the route towards a temporary resolution more transparent. And indeed,
just as is the case with purely epistemological disputes, a step towards resolution,
or reconciliation between disputants, is taken by transparent presentation of the
strengths and weaknesses of both sides. But reason alone will not be the judge,
and we will be better prepared for the verdict the sooner we realise this.
Bernard Williams takes this lesson further in his criticism of Raz’s thesis (Wil-
liams, 2003: 117). He says that value pluralism is a thesis about values, not in it-
self a political or ethical ideal. It is a simple factual claim that contemporary soci-
eties (in the Western hemisphere at least) are conscious of value pluralism, are
conscious of the rational under-determination of values espoused in their midst.
Williams claims that once such consciousness is achieved there is no “going
back” without explicit trampling of highly general values. But without some erro-
neous teleological assumption about the “evolution” of human societies towards
increasing self-consciousness, there is no way of ranking pluralist societies higher
than non-pluralist ones. This means that Raz’s thesis, and its attempted separation
from social relativism, should not even be expected to provide a justification for
the way contemporary societies deal with evaluative judgements, or the very con-
cept of value. Williams urges us to use Raz’s thesis to see that historical and
evaluative enquiry into our own values are not entirely separate from one an-
other, and to drop the accompanying talk of the existence of values. But he per-
mits the use or Raz’s elaborate explication to enlighten many other issues we en-
counter in relation to values. Whether values exist or not, Raz’s explication allows
us some rational justification for presenting value hierarchies limited to our own
“back yard”.
Both political knowledge and that of natural sciences can be illustrative in deny-
ing Raz’s thesis its metaphysical (though not instrumental) status. If human inter-
action with the world has the veristic aim elevated to explicit value in natural sci-
ences, then what metaphysical gain is provided by the explicit introduction of
such value through the sustaining social practice (i.e. some ideal scientific prac-
tice)? Namely, nothing changed in the worth of truth-seeking (seen here as re-
specting some externalist constrictions on knowledge, not as tapping into the
“cosmic register of truths”) as aligning with the real world with the introduction
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of social practice that presents the understanding of its true nature. If, on the
other hand, truth-seeking was always valuable and the social practice that is ex-
plicit about valuing it merely brings wider social recognition of its inherent value,
then Raz’s thesis does not provide anything more than relativism already does.
For, however metaphysically strong the existence of some value is (such as
truth-seeking may be), on Raz’s thesis that strength is irrelevant to any human so-
ciety until some social practice brings it to the fore, just like a convention does
not functionally exist until some social group makes it their convention (they do
not need to provide an assent for this).
The situation is reversed with political knowledge. There, we are not prone to
saying that associated values always existed as values. Most, or all of them, were
imbued with value through some social processes (sometimes backed up by ra-
tional considerations, other times by what we now see as myth-making), and it is
a matter of fact that in other times or in other societies they are not values
(though they may still be values from our perspective). Truth-seeking (though
this does not mean solely the kind of truth-seeking encoded in modern science)
did not become a value when humans decided to be practically devoted to it, be-
cause it was always the case that anything other than truth-seeking (in whatever
convoluted shape) was to put one at odds with reality. But liberal social values
characteristic of contemporary societies were not ‘valued’ in the past ones; that is
a historical fact.12 So those societies must have been either blind or inherently
mean (i.e. bent on pursuing what is not of value). But pluralism alone precludes
us from ever delivering such a verdict, whilst the metaphysical demand for exis-
tence of values calls for it.
Probably the best reconciliatory route is to embrace some form of relativism, and
be explicitly conscious of this fact. We cannot indeed make the school value-free
(thus opening the way for most vulgar value-relativism supplied through other
means, an “anything goes” scenario), but should not make it stick to immutably
imposed value-sets either. Rationally guided (though not rationally hierarchically
organised) exposition to a range of value-sets and accompanying social practices
is the best that can be achieved aiming for maximum coexistence (as Raz’s
genre-based evaluations seem to allow), whilst being aware of Isaiah Berlin’s
warning that in any political decision (in this case one that sets the outer limits of
the value-sets) there are inevitable value losses. Explicit awareness of values held
by an individual, and their explicit confrontation through the genre-based ap-
proach advocated by Raz, could help strengthen (up to a point, and differently in
different cases) individuals’ knowledge aspirations when faced with the lack of
externally provided certainty.
So far so good for social values incorporated in political education. But, as has al-
ready been stressed above, there are difficulties with translating such a model of
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12 What is more pressing for education today, they are not “valued” in many of the pre-
sent ones.
“individual certainty procurement” directly into school science subjects, though
there are some lessons that can be learnt. It seems that it is important to teach
about science alongside of teaching science itself (cf. Hodson, 1998: 209–210).13
This may allow us to escape from undesired epistemological relativism into
seemingly less problematic ethical relativism: science, like any other social prac-
tice, has its own set of values which are most appropriate to its limited aims (and
for the purposes of contemporary education those can in fact be limited) and
which allow every individual student to ground the knowledge appropriate upon
the tentative adoption of those values. One such value-related attitude to science
is given by Goldman’s comparative scientific superiority mentioned above: scien-
tific practices are better at handling their tasks than any set of non-scientific prac-
tices available. Moreover, though criticism of this worth focuses on “philosophi-
cally abstruse questions about theoretical frameworks or referential success”
(Goldman, 1999: 250), the strength of scientific superiority14 lies in simple and
obvious kinds of knowledge (such as plainly observable predictions) understand-
able to everyone.
Philosophically, both the “hard” and the “soft” subjects suffer from similar epi-
stemological and ethical ailments (as do their respective social disciplines). Epi-
stemologically, lack of certainty demanded by contemporary critiques of aca-
demic hegemony of certain disciplines and mandated by contemporary analyses
of knowledge, makes the role of community in legitimation of knowledge more
transparent than has been the case a century ago. Though this is not as extensive
in sciences as it is in political education, the selection of knowledge for curricular
presentation can bring to the fore a disproportional amount of instances of such
knowledge (through teaching of general theoretical frameworks and striving for
explanatory unification).
Ethically, the general theory of values struggles to find a universal distillate of
values applicable across social practices and cultures, so as to respect pluralism
without giving in to relativism. Again, despite differences between what is valued
in sciences and politics, relativistic attitudes are hard to avoid in both disciplines.
Whilst the values of sciences (avoidance of extreme epistemic disagreements be-
tween human conceptions and “the state of affairs in the world”) apply to a lim-
ited genre only, the values behind political knowledge cannot be rationally or-
dered in importance disregarding the social and historical context. Metaphysical
theses about the existence of values merely detract from the importance of trans-
520
Sociologija sela, 44 (2006) 174 (4): 505-524
S
o
c
i
o
l
o
g
i
j
a
s
e
l
a
13 Though, we must also bear in mind Hodson’s methodological aspects of this general
proposal: “[…] I recognise that telling students, too early, that scientific inquiry is con-
text-dependent and idiosyncratic could be puzzling, frustrating and even off-putting.”
(Hodson, 1998:210).
14 This is superiority of non-scientific disciplines competing with science for explanation
of the same phenomena, and not all other possible disciplines available to humans. Thus,
we are not talking of the conflict between naturalism and relativism here.
parent recognition, both in the case of what is valued in science education and
what is valued in political education, of social influences on the formation of
value-sets called upon in legitimation of uncertain knowledge.
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Hard knowledge, soft values
Sa`etak
Rad uspore|uje dva podru~ja {kolskog obrazovanja (kao paradigme “tvrdih” i “mekih”
predmeta), prirodne znanosti i odgoj za gra|anstvo (popularnije, “politi~ko obrazovanje”),
obzirom na njihove epistemolo{ke i moralne temelje. Na po~etku je izra`en kontrast iz-
me|u svjetonazora implicitnih u spomenuta dva predmeta unutar {kolske zajednice. Po-
tom se istra`uju epistemolo{ki problemi zajedni~ki obama predmetima, te se daje pregled
rasprave izme|u epistemolo{kog relativizma i “naturalizma” (koji je oblik fundacionalizma)
vezane uz znanje u prirodnim znanostima. Kroz pregled op}ih filozofijskih na~ela u poza-
dini izbora sadr`aja za {kolske predmete, uvodi se pitanje vrijednosti kao i epistemi~ki i
eti~ki va`nog aspekta {kolskog obrazovanja. Analiza koja se na to nadovezuje nastoji po-
kazati da ~ak i u ovom pogledu postoji vi{e sli~nosti izme|u “mekih” i “tvrdih” predmeta
nego se standardno pretpostavlja.
Klju~ne rije~i: prirodne znanosti, odgoj za gra|anstvo, naturalizam, relativizam, znanje,
vrijednosti
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Résumé
Cette étude compare deux domaines de l'enseignement scolaire (comme paradigmes des
disciplines “dures” “hard” et “molles” “soft”), les sciences naturelles et l'éducation pour la
population (plus populaire, “éducation politique”), compte tenu de leurs principes épisté-
mologiques et moraux. Au début est exprimé le contraste entre les conceptions idéologi-
ques implicites dans les deux disciplines mentionnées au sein de la communauté scolaire.
Puis font l'objet de recherches les problèmes épistémologiques communs aux deux disci-
plines, et est présenté un aperçu de l'étude entre le relativisme épistémologique et le “na-
turalisme” (qui est une forme du fondationalisme), liée aux connaissances dans le do-
maine des sciences naturelles. A travers l'aperçu des principes philosophiques généraux, à
l'arrière-plan du choix des sujets pour les disciplines scolaires, est introduite la question
des valeurs en tant qu'aspect important, épistologiquement et éthiquement, de l'enseigne-
ment scolaire. L'analyse qui s'y rattache s'efforce de montrer que même à ce point de vue
il existse plus de ressemblances entre les disciplines “molles” “soft” et “dures” “hard” que
cela est supposé habituellement.
Mots-clés: Sciences naturelles, éducation pour la population, naturalisme, relativisme,
connaissances, valeurs
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